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Abstract

Local councils in New South Wales (NSW) have the authority to invest
ratepayers’ money that is not currently required for any other purpose by the council.
At the end of 2006-07 financial year local councils in New South Wales had invested
$590 million dollars in structured financial products such as collateralised debt
obligations (CDO). By the end of January 2008, six months later, the market value of
these investments dropped $200 million to $390 million. Since then the financial
investment market has further significantly reduced with the value of the councils’
investments losing many more millions of dollars.

In NSW the state government

commissioned a review of the financial exposures of NSW local councils to be
undertaken by Mr Michael Cole. The Cole Report published in 2008 found that while
acting within the parameters of the Local Government Act (1993), local councils had
pursued high return high risk investment strategies. This paper reviews and evaluates
how the local councils in NSW, identified by Cole as having a high level of exposure
to these forms of investments, have disclosed their financial investments in their
2007-08 financial reports; the type of audit opinion expressed on these reports; and
the impact of these investment related losses on the ability of NSW local councils to
provide current and future services.
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Introduction
Local councils in New South Wales have been given the authority under
section 625 of the Local Government Act (1993) to invest monies that are not required
for immediate use in a range of financial instruments. This authority to invest monies
that has been derived from the ratepayers within each community, and is not required
for immediate use, has a number of restrictions with respect to the types of allowed
investment types, which have been imposed by the NSW Department of Local
Government.

The NSW Department of Local Government is a State Government regulatory
agency responsible for implementing the Local Government Act of 1993. In addition,
the department also provides policy advice to the NSW State Government, manages
the relationship between councils and the State Government and is responsible for the
financial framework under which local governments operate (DLG 2008a). The other
major role undertaken by the NSW Department of Local Government is to work with
the councils so they are able to appropriately deliver services to their communities
(DLG 2008a).

This paper looks at the significant financial exposure, identified in the Cole
report (2008), of a number of councils in NSW that had in relation to their
investments in structured financial products such as collateralised debt obligations
(CDO) and the impact of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holding Inc who
managed many of the councils’ investments. The paper also considers how those
councils have disclosed their exposure to CDO’s in the financial reports of 2007/08,
how their auditors have addressed the problem through their audit reports and the
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potential impact on local councils in NSW ability to continue to provide services for
their constituents.

Background to local government structure in Australia
Australia operates under a three tier government system consisting of Federal
(Commonwealth) government; state government and, local government comprising
the third tier (Boon et al, 2005). The Commonwealth (Federal) government oversee a
federation consisting of six states and two territories and have been granted the
authority under the Commonwealth Constitution Act 1900 (Burritt and Welch 1997).
Within the States and Territories are local government councils who, in Australia, are
responsible for, building and maintaining roads, developing infrastructure for
essential services, such as water supply, providing waste removal, community
sporting facilities and care services such as child and aged care (Boon et al, 2005).
The State and Territory governments are responsible for specifying the powers and
responsibilities of the local government entities within each state (Boon et al, 2005).
This paper focuses on the local government councils in the Australian state of New
South Wales (NSW).

Councils in New South Wales
In NSW the first piece of legislation to establish a system of local government
was passed in 1842 under the NSW South Wales Constitution Act 1842. This Act
provided the Governor of NSW power to create a to “create district councils for the
purpose of constructing and maintaining roads, police services, water supply and a
variety of other local services and infrastructure requirements” (Dredge 2001, p. 358).
The Governor was also given the power to appoint the wardens and councillors to the
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28 district councils he [and it was always a he] had established (Dredge 2001). This
Act was repealed in 1858 when the Municipalities Act 1858 passed.

The Act

introduced the notion of representative government; however the population of some
of the municipalities were of a size that it was not financially possible for them to
undertake the tasks for which they were created (Dredge 2001). Like the 1842 Act the
Municipalities Act 1858 was repealed and the new Act was passed in 1867; however
the problem of financial inefficiencies with small councils continued (Dredge 2001).

After Federation in 1901, when “the separate colonies of the then British
Empire in Australia decided to join together” (APH 2008, p.1), a new Act was passed
in 1906 which recognised the needs of non rate paying members of the community.
According to Dredge (2001) this Act “represented a great advance for local
government in NSW, establishing the major principles by which modern local
government operated (2001, p. 365). The principles of the 1906 Act were reflected in
the 1919 Act which was in place for the next seventy four years until the current NSW
Local Government Act 1993 was passed.

The NSW Local Government Act 1993 reflects the changes society has
experienced over the past one hundred years including the significant economic and
technological changes and the changing requirements of society and society’s
expectations of local government. The 1993 Act was meant to include provisions to
accommodate the changes society has undergone by emphasising “greater
accountability by councils to their communities; more professional management of
the day-to-day activities of councils; and increased flexibility to devise methods of
efficient service delivery and the performance of regulatory activities” (Dredge 2001,
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p. 370). However, the two main limitations imposed on local government remain; the
relatively small size of councils which inhibits financial effectiveness and the level of
power held by the State government.

One way to overcome the associated efficiency problems of small councils has
been the development and implementation of a number of reforms to the financial
reporting requirements of local governments.

These reforms, which included

identification and reporting on key performance measures and reporting on a financial
year basis rather than a calendar year, occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and
were promoted on the basis that they would improve the usefulness for decision
making and enhance accountability (Carnegie 2005). The next section will discuss
the financial reporting obligations of the NSW local government councils and the
audit of those financial reports.

NSW Local Government Act 1993
Section 413 of the NSW Local Government Act 1993 [hereafter the 1993 Act]
requires NSW councils to prepare each year financial reports which include the
general purpose financial reports of the council as well as a an audit report which
includes the opinion of an external auditor on the general purpose financial reports.
The general purpose financial reports of the council are to be audited by the council’s
auditor within four months after the end of the financial year (section 416) and the
auditor is to issue a report which includes a statement “as to whether, in the opinion of
the auditor, the council’s accounting records have been kept in accordance with the
requirements” (section 417). This is similar to the normal reporting requirements of
private sector organisations however the objectives of private sector organisations are
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significantly different to those of a local government council. The local government
councils are there to support and provide specific services to their local community.
Many of the assets of local government councils are considered to be public goods
which differ to private sector assets because public goods are generally non-rival and
non-excludable (Barton 2002, p. 43). For example public parks and roads, these are
public goods available for all members of the community and the use of these goods
by one member of the community does not deprive another member of the community
use of the public good.

The other area of commonality, in relation to the financial reporting and
financial accountability, between private sector organisations and local government
councils is found in section 422 of the 1993 Act which outlines the requirements for
the appointment by the local government council of an external financial report
auditor. This commonality creates a level of confusion as the financial reports of
most public sector organisations are generally audited by a state audit office. For
example Federal government organisations in Australia are required to have their
financial reports audited by the Australian National Audit Office, while State
government entities are audited by the State government’s Audit Office. However,
the NSW local government councils are required to “appoint a person as its auditor”
who is a registered company auditor, or a partnership or corporation which includes a
registered company auditor (section 422). In addition the local government councils
are required to undertake compulsory audit tendering every six years (Boon et al,
2005, p. 221).

One of the outcomes of compulsory tendering has been the

introduction of “significant on-going competition to the local government audit
market in NSW to produce long-term savings” (Boon et al, 2005, p. 222); however is
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this outcome what members of the community would expect? The result of
competitive tendering for audit services has resulted in reduced quality of audits due
to the necessary budget constraints arising from lower audit receipts (Houghton et al,
2003, Karen 2002).

The next section will outline the financial exposure, due to investment in
various investment schemes, of the NSW local councils with particular focus on
collaterised debt obligations (CDOs) and the investment bank Lehman Brothers
Holding Inc.

NSW Local Government Exposure
Sikka et al explain that since late 2007 there has been a “deepening banking
and financial crisis arising from sub-prime lending practices by banks, which in turn
has restricted the availability of credit and has led to what has come to be described as
a ‘credit crunch’” (2009, p. 136). There have been numerous accusations about who
should be blamed for the crisis from the over reliance of neoliberal ideologies
believing the market is able to take care of itself, to the excessive greed of those
charged with the running and directing the financial institutions (Roskham 2008, p.9)
and poor government regulation (Zingales, 2008) and “market complacency brought
about by several years of positive returns” (Zingales, 2008, p. 2). Whatever the
reason, whoever is the cause, the end result is very clear, the global financial markets
have, and continue, to decline. The impact of the financial crisis has been widespread
and profound. Many people have lost their jobs, many have lost their life savings and
investments and others have seen their superannuation balances decrease or even
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disappear. Significant impacts have been felt by a wide variety of individuals, as well
as organisations such as councils in NSW.

In the financial year 2007-08 the NSW the Local government sector was a
$7.3 billion industry with the councils collecting $3.5 billion in rates and charges
(DLG 2008b, p. 6). Unlike the majority of other public sector organisations the local
councils in NSW have been allowed under the 1993 Act, to invest in a variety of
investment schemes for the purpose of earning additional revenue. As at 30 June
2007 the face value of the total investments of NSW local councils totalled $5.7
billion. Given the size of the investments, which have varying degrees of risk, and the
fluctuating economic conditions in 2007 (DLG 2008c) and the growing global impact
from the sub-prime crisis in the United States, the NSW Department of Local
Government commissioned a review of the councils investments. In April 2008 the
final report, the Cole Report, of the commissioned Review of NSW Local
Government Investments was published. The purpose of the review was to verify the
total investment exposure of NSW local government councils as well as determine the
extent of unrealized losses from these investments (Cole 2008, p. 3). This report was
commissioned to address the NSW State government’s concerns about the impact of
the decline in the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States on the investments
of councils. The following table outlines the exposure identified in the final report
Investment Type
CDO
Capital protected
Managed Funds
Subordinated debt
Term
Deposit,
cash, bills
Total

Face Value @
30/6/07 ($m)
590
450
2,420
600
1,630

Market Value @
31/1/08 ($m)
390
400
2,350
600
1,630

Estimated Loss
($m)
200
50
70
Nil
Nil

Estimated Loss
(%)
34%
11%
3%
Nil
Nil

5,690

5,370

320

5.6%
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Council funds are primarily composed of two types; short term working
capital, which accounts for approximately 70% of the total, and longer term funds
comprising the 30% residual, which includes capital expenditure commitments (Cole
2008, p9). While it appears that councils have maintained higher levels of security
over the short term funds by investing in traditional fixed interest products, which
does not appear to be the case with respect to the longer term investments. The
purpose of investing long term funds should be to ensure that the return generated is
sufficient to negate the negative impact of inflation on future capital works. However,
Cole (2008) highlighted that NSW councils were attracted to higher prospective
returns available by investing in new investment types that differed from the
traditional fixed interest products (p9-10).

These new investment types were specifically engineered to meet the
requirements of the Investment Order (refer Appendix 1) and while compliance with
the conditions were essential to allow councils to invest, it should not have been the
only or sufficient requirement to qualify these types of investment, as NSW councils
are also required to comply with their fiduciary responsibilities as trustees of public
funds (Cole 2008, p10). Commonly the principle investment amounts were credit
rated or bank guaranteed, however the income stream from the investments were not.
Simple compliance with the Investment Order was a liberal interpretation, of fulfilling
the requirements and expectations associated with managing public monies, and did
little to account for the risk associated with these types of financial instruments.

The biggest exposure for NSW local government councils is in relation to the
investments in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) where the investments are in
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“asset backed securities whose underlying collateral is typically a portfolio of bonds
or bank loans” (Duffie and Garleanu 2001, p. 41). The face value of the investments
in CDOs dropped from $590m in 30th June 2007 to $390m on 30th June 2008, an
estimated loss of $200 million (Cole 2008, p. 3).

The main promoter of CDO’s to the NSW local government councils was
Lehman Brothers who were “notorious for marketing investment schemes to local
councils which have resulted in those councils losing millions of ratepayer’s dollars”
(Roskam, 2008, p. 9). Unfortunately for millions of investors, including NSW local
government councils who invested in Lehmans Brothers’ financial investment
schemes and the people employed by Lehman Brothers, the investment bank filed for
bankruptcy on 14th September 2008. Zingales suggests the aggressive leverage policy
of Lehman Brothers’, “bad regulation, lack of transparency, and market complacency
brought about by several years of positive returns” (2008, p. 2) led to the collapse of
Lehman Brothers. This collapse, of the fourth largest investment bank in the United
States, “is generally credited with precipitating the near total collapse of confidence
that subsequently engulfed the international monetary system” (Roskam, 2008, p. 9).

In response to the collapse of Lehman Brothers the NSW Department of Local
Government issued a Council Circular to all NSW councils, two days after the
collapse, on the 16th September 2008 requiring councils to “seek urgent financial
advice as to their potential exposure to Lehman Brothers, as a matter of urgency.
Councils are required [emphasis added] to identify investments that have direct
exposure to Lehman Brothers and outline the effect it may have on the Council’s
activities” (DLG, 2008c).
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The Cole report (2008) estimates that overall NSW councils have lost $320
million from their investment portfolio, which represents 5.6% of total investments
and 15.2% of long term funds (p11). The problem with interpreting these figures is
that most of these losses are from unrealised investment portfolios and the valuations
of future returns have generally been provided by those that were also involved in
marketing the products to councils. Therefore the future returns may potentially be
significantly overstated and Cole (p11) identified the exposure in one case to be 85%
of the capital investment. Additionally, a number of councils are holding 45% of their
total investments in financial instruments; such as CDO’s, which potentially have the
greatest risk of loss.

NSW councils seem to have pursued a policy of either chasing higher returns
or allowing themselves to be lured into investments containing higher risk factors than
they have traditionally accepted. It is unclear if there was a true understanding of the
relationship between higher risk and return trade-off. The up side of accepting higher
risk was capped at “a couple of percent above the risk free rate” (Cole 2008, p11), yet
the downside, as stated previously, has been recorded as 85% of the original
investment. This suggests that some local council’s failed to understand that taking on
higher risk could generate higher returns or potentially higher losses.

The following section discusses the audit function which NSW local
government councils use to assess the quality of their financial statements.

Audit function
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Sequeria and Johnson state that “the audit function has assumed the role of
conferring credibility on the financial statements and ensuring that the statements
could be relied on for decision making” (2004, p. 94). ASA 200 (2007) states “the
objective of an audit is to enable the auditor to express an opinion as to whether the
financial report is prepared in all material respects, in accordance with an applicable
financial reporting framework. The auditor is required to obtain a level of certainty
that will enable them to provide ‘reasonable assurance’ about the correctness of the
financial reports”. This terminology demonstrates that the auditor does not provide a
guarantee of complete accuracy, by reason of the normal conduct of an audit. The
auditor conducts tests and collects evidence in respect of the accuracy of accounts, but
does not audit all transactions or balances. Therefore to reduce the chance of material
misstatement, areas that are judged by the auditor to be high risk are likely to attract
greater attention.

Boon, McKinnon and Ross explain that stakeholders need to have confidence
that the audit report is reliable so they are able to make appropriate informed
decisions on the financial reports (2008, p93). To improve the level of confidence in
the financial statements, and the subsequent audit report, organisations use external
independent auditors to conduct the financial statement audit. External auditors,
“auditors independent from the entity” (Gay and Simnett 2007, p. 765), when
conducting an audit of local government councils’ General and Special Purpose
Financial reports are required to prepare a report on the council’s financial reports
which includes a statement as to whether, in the opinion of the auditor [emphasis
added] the financial reports have been prepared as required, are consistent with the
council’s records and fairly present the financial position of the council (1993 Act,
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section 417 (2)). The purpose of the audit is to provide assurance about whether the
financial reports have been prepared in accordance with both the relevant accounting
standards and with the Local Government Code of Accounting Practice and Financial
Reporting. However, providing assurance does not guarantee there are no errors,
omissions or that no fraudulent activities have taken place. Rather the audit reports
are supposed to provide a level of confidence that the financial information provided
can be relied upon, particularly by the stakeholders of the councils in making
decisions based upon the financial information contained in the financial reports.

The audit profession is no different to other professions; it requires its
members to be independent through avoiding other economic ties with the client, and
to be absolutely objective in their approach to the audit and the client (Umar and
Anandarajan, 2004). To be able to issue an appropriate audit opinion, one of the
fundamental principles of professional ethics is that of objectivity which is the
principle that “an auditor should not allow prejudices or bias, conflict of interest or
undue influence of others to override professional or business judgement” (Gay and
Simnett 2007, p. 17). To meet the fundamental principle of objectivity it is vital that
auditors are and are seen to be independent. This view is consistent with Arens et al
(2007) who explain that to be independent an auditor must be free from any bias in
relation to all aspects of the audit engagement

The following extract from the Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants
outlines the requirement of independence of external financial statement auditors:
Independence requires:
Independence of Mind
The state of mind that permits the expression of a conclusion without
being affected by influences that compromise professional judgment,
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allowing an individual to act with integrity, and exercise objectivity
and professional skepticism.
Independence in Appearance
The avoidance of facts and circumstances that are so significant that a
reasonable and informed third party, having knowledge of all relevant
information, including safeguards applied, would reasonably conclude
a Firm’s, or a member of the Assurance Team’s, integrity, objectivity
or professional skepticism had been compromised. (APES 110, Section
290.8)

To determine if an auditor is independent, all the relevant circumstances,
including all relationships between the audit client and the auditor need to be
considered (Hayes, 2002, p6). However there are an increasing number of barriers to
audit independence such as the expansion of the provision of non-audit services,
which has resulted in a decline in the relative importance of audit fees, co
modification of the audit, resulting in lower profits, reduced skill and reduction of
resources allocated to the task (Hayes 2002, p. 3).

The independent auditor is required to issue an opinion about whether the
financial reports of the council being audited provide a true and fair view of the
financial position and are in compliance with the Accounting Standards and relevant
financial reporting regulations. There are two main opinions an auditor can issue for
a local government council’s financial statements: an unqualified opinion which
indicates the auditor is of the opinion that the council’s financial statements do not
contain any material misstatements and are a true and fair view of the council and are
in compliance with the Accounting Standards; and a qualified opinion is where the
auditors are of the opinion the council’s financial statements contain certain
circumstances which are material or are likely to be material (Gay and Simnett 2007)
and may, if relied upon by decisions makers, result in an incorrect decision being
taken.
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The assessment of materiality and relative importance of qualitative and
quantitative factors are matters for the auditors’ judgement (AuAH 2009, p56). Items
that represent more than 10% of the balance of any account are normally considered
material, items that are between 5% and 10% of any account are normally only
material at the discretion of the auditor and items that are less than 5% are normally
considered not material. However, the overriding factor is if inclusion or exclusion of
the information would influence the decision making process of the users of the
reports. Therefore items that only affect an account by 1% may be judged to be
material if the auditor believes that providing information about the matter may affect
the stakeholders’ decision making process.

The importance of independence of financial report auditors can not be
underestimated however independence does not guarantee an appropriate audit
opinion:
“As independent experts, auditors claim to be able to mediate uncertainty and
construct an objective account of business affairs to enable shareholders and
significant other to manage risks. This construction of reality is legitimised by
appeals to a variety of standards, benchmarks, techniques and bodies of
knowledge, but such claims are precarious as they are routinely undermined
by periodic scandals, crisis, frauds, emergence of new technologies, patterns
of trade and changes in capitalistic economies” (Sikka et al 2009, p. 136).
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It should be clear that performance indicators (such as financial reports) ought
to be “both audited and publicly disclosed” in the interests of accountability and
transparency (Carnegie, 2005, p85).

NSW councils invested in CDO portfolios in the hope of generating higher
than normally returns from their long term investments. These investments were
aggressively marketed, including by Lehman Brothers, as complying with the
Investment Order for NSW Local councils. This order requires councils able to invest
to invest in those securities that had a minimum credit rating from Moody’s
Investment Services Inc, Standard and Poor’s Investment Services Inc or Fitch
Rating. Prior to the downgrades that subsequently occurred, the investments by NSW
local councils were AAA, then AA and AA-, which met the minimum requirements,
however by February 2008 they were CCC-. Yet even prior to the downgrade the
market was strongly suggesting that the “credit rating was far too optimistic and
would significantly deteriorate” (Cole 2008 p11).

Funds held by NSW local councils, that they are allowed to invest, fall into
two categories and are classed as restricted or unrestricted in respect of their final use.
In particular restricted funds may have additional conditions related to them. These
funds include monies from developer contributions, environmental levies, or leave
entitlements. However reporting by councils appear to pool together these funds
leaving it unclear where they have invested funds to meet particular liabilities or long
term investment strategies (Cole 2008 p 18-19). Councils seem to fund their long term
liabilities from a single pool of investments irrespective of whether the funds have
restrictions placed on them or if they are associated with particular liabilities (Cole
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2008 p19).

This makes assessing councils ability to fund particular long term

liabilities extremely difficult. Cole (2008) made some recommendations and
suggested that councils should be reminded of their inability to “contract out”
fiduciary responsibilities to external funds managers, that product manufacturers be
banned from providing advice to councils, and that the NSW DLG should release a
formal model of investment guidelines (Cole, 2008 cited in Gold 2008 p42). One of
the major impacts of local council losses from CDOs is that much of these funds were
earmarked for future projects. These projects will not only be impacted by these
losses, but will also be impacted by the decline in value of the funds due to
diminished or nil returns. In addition the impact of inflationary pressures will also
make those projects less viable and possibly require additional funds to complete.

Audit Reports
Analysis of the audited financial reports of NSW council’s show that a large
proportion of external auditors used the exact same wording for reporting on CDO’s,
and in some cases within specific accounting firms used a standard letter of
qualification with spaces to hand write in details such as page numbers.

This

highlights that these were generic reports, which therefore raises concerns about the
independence of these audit reports and the level of effort in undertaking the audit.
Commonality of wording both within audit firms and between audit firms could be an
attempt to create a common response to the issue which would be an indicator of lack
of auditor independence.

Auditors that conducted audits of a number of councils also formed a variety
of opinions. There was no evidence to suggest that they just assumed problems due to
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the sub prime mortgage market, which suggests that the audits were probably
conducted independently. However the format of the qualified report on the subprime problems was generally consistent not only within particular audit firms but
also between audit firms. This suggests that audit firms have applied a standard
reporting form to disclose issues relating to the sub prime mortgage market problems
and in the cases of the councils that Cole (2008) identified as at risk, all had qualified
audit opinions identifying the uncertainty related to valuation of CDO investments.
While this could be expected, it was surprising to discover that the values reported
were the same as reported by Cole in February 2008. This implies that councils and in
turn the auditors accepted those values without reporting the continued decline in
value.

Other findings from the review of the financial reports have shown that the
audit fees disclosed within the reports are ambiguous, with separate audit fees relating
to a number of audit functions including, but not limited to, audits of the financial
reports. This raises questions with respect to the independence of auditors if there is
fee reliance on additional audit functions. Craswell (2002) suggested that qualified
audit reports are a strong indicator that independence has not been compromised, due
to the competitive nature of auditing. This may not be true in the public sector if there
are limited firms willing to engage in auditing of local government bodies. If it is an
indicator then the high proportion of qualified audit reports would show that
independence is being maintained.

The introduction of competitive tendering for NSW local government
financial statement auditing in the 1993 Act has introduced the possibility that
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auditors may experience greater time budget pressures. A recent survey concerning
reduced audit quality identified 48% of participants admitted to having to reduce audit
quality practices during the completion phase of the audit, which includes the review
for subsequent events (Coram, Ng and Woodliff. 2003). This would suggest that with
complex issues such as the losses related to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, auditors
may not allocate sufficient time to determine the full extent of the losses.

Future research

This research has highlighted a number of areas of interest for further
research. Why has there been a standard reporting method of the sub-prime issues?
Is it a result of suggestions from the local government association, ease of completion,
or a perceived need to be consistent in reporting? As identified by Cole (2008) there is
a need for a standard analysis and reporting method to be developed for local
councils.

Councils are required to report the fees that they have paid to auditors and the
financial reports show these fees. However, there does seem to be a lack of clarity as
to what those fees are for. For example some council’s have shown an audit fee
presumably for the audit of the financial reports, and then have also shown other audit
fees. While it is likely, and may be presumed that the other audit fees are for audits of
particular sectors such as OHS, water or environment, it needs to be clarified for a
number of reasons. For example, if the same firm is conducting the additional audits,
and the fees earned from the addition work is substantially greater than from the audit
of the financial reports, there may be some compromise of the independence of the
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financial audit. Likewise it may affect the competiveness of the tender process if
some firms are unable to conduct the additional audits.

Another factor arising from this research is that councils do not separate funds
that relate to particular liabilities or that have separate restrictions associated with
them. There are also inconsistencies among the accounting policies that therefore
impede transparency (Cole 2008 p24). Current reporting policies seem to ignore the
risk that particular products may need to be liquidated prior to maturity triggering
losses that would need to be reported. One solution to this would be to promote the
use of current market valuations across the full range of investment products. There
seems to be a strong need to improve consistency of the reporting, and the accounting
methods used to account for, and value these products.
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